[Abstract Given the high ethno-racial polarization that favored Liberal Democrats in the 2000 elections the likelihood appears strong that Republican commitment to permissive immigration will doom its electoral prospects for national dominance. Yet such a common sense prediction may be erroneous due to several fortuitous factors. Furthermore, even in the absence of Republican policy change vis-à-vis mass immigration and multiculturalism, future GOP national victories might provide greater opportunities for growth of a patriotic nationalist movement.]
Is George W. Bush the last Republican president? Does it matter? These are exceptionally important questions for those who love the America bequeathed to us by our ancestors. Unfortunately, even tentative 'answers' must be hedged with cautious uncertainty. Not only is the track record for historical prediction modest at best, but our fears and idealistic aspirations can easily subvert objectivity. Thus, important factors at variance with our beliefs may be unintentionally minimized or ignored. Even 'common sense,' as will be seen, can be misleading.
Indeed, the latter would suggest that Bush as the 'last' Republican president is the easier question. Even his party's operatives are cognizant of exit poll ethno-racial and regional electoral patterns. Not only do they point to the failure of W's multicultural racial outreach, but his permissive stance vis a vis the Third World invasion and concomitant demographic trends epitomize the height of electoral irrationality. This because of his and the party's dogmatic adherence to 'reachout' rainbowism! Thus, within four to eight years at the most, the Republicans appear destined for minority national status.
Even if some of its more conservative leaders desert in disgust, the residual 'moderates' will be unable to effectively compete with the Democrats. This for several reasons, of which their historical European-American social core and ideological legacy are most salient.
In the short-term, it is impossible to divorce such an entity from its integral 'free market,' role of law and strong Christian symbolic identity or commitments. Nor is it possible to equal the zeal of Left-inspired Liberals in pandering to class envy, racial minority status, or feminist hypersensitivities among infected single women.
Much more than the urban-based Democrats, the party suffers from a paucity of militant grass roots activists in those very areas where alien and other voter fraud is most rampant. Assuming that legislation and administrative practices that have facilitated this subversion of citizenship obligations are not effectively reversed, this would appear to be the nail in the Republican national coffin - notwithstanding post-2000 census redistricting.
Does such a 'common sense' approach rule out remission of the GOP's terminal decline and a possible return to national hegemony? A categorical affirmative answer appears justified only in the absence of several fortuitous events as well as a strategic possibility. Indeed, any one of these conceivably might obviate or at least stave-off an actual internment!
The first pertains to Democratic and Republican leadership quality - crucial intangibles that remain problematic for the present. What if George W's popularity gradually increases, thus broadening and deepening his mass appeal? Conversely, should Hillary outmaneuver her less divisive and more attractive rivals (e.g., Gephardt), her polarizing negatives could markedly enhance Republican white male, married female, Asian, and even some Latino support. Major breakthroughs by Judicial Watch could also seriously weaken Democratic appeal, especially among European-Americans.
Perhaps less problematic than the foregoing may be Green Party institutionalization and a campaign by Nader or an even more charismatic environmentalist! Intense resistance to Democratic blandishments can be expected from the eco-fanatical activists at the core of this growing anti-capitalist party. Unless the Democrats nominate an openly pro-environmental extremist, Green electoral appeal might again be sufficient to ensure Republican victory. On the other hand, a Democratic candidate who militantly denounced Republican energy and growth policies would drive numerous moderate and even some materialistic minority followers into the Republican constituency.
Finally, there are the structural risks of deepening the recession due to unprecedented multisectoral debt levels, malinvestment, derivative as well as equity speculation, stagflation, dollar weakening, and OPEC measures. Bush's responses, alternatively possible war in the Middle East or the Formosa Straits and/or a major act of terrorism, might well put the Democrats on the defensive for some years. Similar consequences could flow from a less likely and dramatic national anti-voting fraud reform that effectively denied millions of urban votes to the Democrats.
Least probable yet most effective might be a tacit reversal of Republican multicultural electoral strategy. One can envision, as Sam Francis perspicaciously recommends, a 'Southern' or European-American shift in emphasis that inspires much higher electoral support from the party's traditional middle and upper working class constituency. Yet leadership timidity reinforced by a neo-conservative globalist ethos almost certainly militate against adoption of the Francis Proposal. More probable will be continued suppression or exclusion of those conservative nationalists favoring such an option who as yet remain within the GOP.
Short of this last and least probable 'reborn Republican' option, one is tempted to doubt whether it matters if the Republicans decline by 2004 or manage to postpone their demise for a decade or so due to fortuitous events such as those discussed previously. Yet here too our instinctual common sense may be more emotionally therapeutic than enlightening.
'Least probable yet most effective might be a tacit reversal of Republican multicultural electoral strategy...Short of this least probable 'reborn Republican' option, one is tempted to doubt whether it matters if the Republicans decline by 2004 or manage to postpone their demise for
a decade or so...'
Both the Phillips and particularly the Buchanan Reform campaigns demonstrated that the patriotic movement lacks the resources, organization, unity, leadership, and committed mass following to effectively challenge hegemonic bi-partisan multicultural globalist elites. Notwithstanding the ouster of Spencer Abraham and the temporary defeat of recent alien mass amnesty legislation, nationalists are as yet far too weak to even halt the Liberal deconstructionist assault upon our heritage and citizenship itself.
Yet there are certain advantages that could result from a decade or so of Republican dominance. First, Liberal frustration, militant antagonism, and probable extremism (e.g., slavery 'reparations') would increase. This could frighten even more 'middle' Americans as the latter's impending demographic subordination became blatrantly obvious.
Not only would this enhance the growing patriotic constituency, it would provide much-needed time to develop adequate resources, unity, tactics, and leadership. Of vital importance to this process is the level of Liberal bigotry and demonization, state surveillance, and suppressive acts against nationalists. It is reasonable to assume that such tendencies would be considerably less intense and systematic under Republicans.
Even if the latter opportunistically react down the line to growing nationalist support by endeavoring to co-opt patriotic movement supporters by altering some policies (e.g., immigration or affirmative action), this would reorient the country away from multiculturalism and globalism. Violent reactive Leftist protests, in turn, might provide new opportunities to strengthen the patriotic movement's legitimacy and appeal.
At worst, a belated Republican shift toward greater suppression will be as half-hearted as the party's recent de facto acquiescence to affirmative action and cultural deconstructionism. By then nationalists presumably will be stronger and more effective in resisting even pervasive attempts to fragment and intimidate the movement. Further, many nationalist-inclined conservative Republicans and their supporters who oppose such measures may defect or at least decline to actively support them.
Despite the plausibility of this scenario, it is also conceivable that continued Republican hegemony under any of the circumstances identified earlier might be perceived to reduce the urgency of nationalist movement expansion. Certainly a Liberal Democratic national victory in two or four years would catalyze intense desperation and activism. Yet the denouement of militant Liberal state and media hegemony in the short-run is likely to be pervasive suppression, this following another 'Waco' or 'Tulsa.' Infiltration and provocation have been historically employed by the Left to provide pre-emptive pretexts. Hence the 'future' of a weakened patriotic movement might well be wholly underground given such circumstances.
A tentative conclusion then is that while most Republicans now do not deserve nationalist support in the absence of at least a major shift on immigration and affirmative action policies, nevertheless patriots will benefit from a more benign movement-building environment and therefore long-term prospects under that party's national dominance. Counter-intuitively, then, it probably does matter whether left-inspired Liberal Democrats replace them in the short-run. More problematic, however, is the likelihood of such an eventuality.