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Competition Between Blacks and Immigrants

by Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson

Economic competition between blacks and immigrants in the United States is not new. In an early example, the artisans in Philadelphia between 1790 and 1820 were mostly black, but they were largely displaced by whites. In the words of W.E.B. DuBois, this phenomenon was due to "the sharp competition of the foreigners and the demand for new sorts of skilled labor of which the Negro was ignorant, and was not allowed to learn."¹ The heavy influx of European immigrants between 1830 and 1860 also displaced many black workers.²

Booker T. Washington, the most prominent black leader of his era, questioned the preference for foreign workers in the southern labor market. Speaking before the Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1895, he said:

*To those of the white race who look to the incoming of those of foreign birth and strange tongue and habits for the prosperity of the South, were I permitted I would repeat what I say to my own race, 'Cast down your bucket where you are.' Cast it down among the eight millions of Negroes whose habits you know... As we have proved our loyalty to you in the past ... so in the future, in our humble way, we shall stand by you with a devotion that no foreigner can approach, ready to lay down our lives, if need be, in defence of yours, interlacing our industrial, commercial, civil, and religious life with yours in a way that shall make the interests of both races one.*³

Despite Washington's plea, shortly after the turn of the century, seven southern states organized "immigration bureaus" to try to meet the South's labor needs with whites and to accelerate the Negro exodus to the North.⁴ But the "Great Migration" of blacks from the South between 1916 and 1935 and their increasing employment in northern industries was in part a consequence of the drop in immigration during World War I and the tighter restrictions on both immigration and the use of temporary "nonimmigrant" workers after World War I.

But two decades of heavy immigration beginning in the 1960s, much of it by unskilled and uneducated workers, has given Washington's concern a new

timeliness. A critical but at times neglected issue in the debates on immigration reform of the past decade and a half is the impact of legal and illegal immigration on the socioeconomic conditions of native blacks and other minorities, particularly those in the secondary, or low-skilled, labor market.

While blacks are affected in many ways, deserving special attention are: (1) the impact of legal and illegal immigrants on blacks in low-wage jobs in the secondary labor market, (2) the attitudes of blacks toward immigration reform before passage of the immigration act, (3) the voting positions of black congressmembers on the immigration reform and control bills of 1984 and 1986, and (4) the likely impact of the act on blacks living in areas with high concentrations of recent immigrants and refugees.

Job Displacement and Wage Depression

Anecdotal data, labor market statistics and simple observation show a pronounced trend during the past two decades of immigrant and refugee workers replacing many native black unskilled, semi-skilled and supervisory workers in such businesses as hotels, restaurants, fast food outlets, light manufacturing firms, construction firms and taxicab companies in metropolitan areas with heavy concentrations of recent immigrants and refugees. Indications of these trends have been confirmed by sectoral and regional studies during the past decade that suggest that undocumented workers displace low-skilled native workers and depress wages.

In the last few years, however, these conclusions have been challenged by studies that have received a great deal of attention although their methods are questionable.⁵ Studies by Kevin McCarthy and Burciago Valdez for The Rand Corporation in 1985 and by Thomas Muller and Thomas Espenshade for the Urban Institute in 1984 contend that immigrants generally do not affect the employment opportunities or earnings of black Californians.⁶ Their studies, while acknowledging the vulnerability of the least skilled, address incompletely the issue of job displacement of blacks by undocumented workers.

A major flaw, for example, in the McCarthy and Valdez study is its comparison of the earnings of year-round, full-time workers in 1969 and 1979 in reaching

**Table 1. Blacks and Hispanics' views on immigration:
Tarrance-Hart Poll, 1983**

<u>Interview Item</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>
Immigration is a most important or very important national issue.	56.3	72.4
U.S. should admit "fewer" or "a lot fewer" legal immigrants.	73.1	49.6
There should be tougher laws for illegal immigrants.	69.8	47.2
Illegal immigrants are a major harm, to U.S. jobless.	69.2	45.9
Illegal immigrants lowering American wages is a major problem.	60.8	38.6
Restricting immigration is bad for the American economy.	47.9	50.9
Favor penalties against employers knowingly hiring illegal immigrants.	65.8	59.2
Favor amnesty for long-time undocumented workers.	57.2	74.1
Favor amnesty for those in the U.S. five-plus years.	59.9	59.2
Favor increasing border controls.	69.0	60.8
Favor free education for illegal immigrants.	55.6	70.1
Support educational instruction in English only.	66.4	43.2
Oppose illegal immigrants receiving welfare.	59.1	56.6
Favor illegal immigrants receiving Medicaid.	50.0	51.6
Support ballots printed in English and Spanish.	75.8	79.9

their conclusion that black earnings had outpaced that of Hispanics. The authors thereby ignored the competition that takes place between blacks and undocumented workers who are not year-round, full-time workers. In addition, they did not take full account of the blacks who were discouraged from looking for work, many of whom were abandoned by their employers in favor of undocumented workers.

...undocumented workers often cause job displacement through the use of occupational kinship networks.

The Muller and Espenshade report also suffered from using too simple a model for the labor market. Their analysis tested a linkage between the black unemployment rate and the percentage of Hispanics in the total population. The percentage of Hispanic immigrants of all ages, however, is clearly an inappropriate measure of their proportion in the labor force. If Muller and Espenshade had determined the relationship between black unemployment rates and the percentage of Hispanic immigrants in the local labor markets, their results might not have supported their claim that rising proportions of Hispanic immigrants in the local markets reduced black unemployment.

One of the most widely disseminated studies of the

job displacement issue, which was prepared by George Borjas and Marta Tienda, concludes that immigrant workers rarely lower the earnings of native workers. However, even they acknowledged that their conclusions are based on "aggregated data for large and diverse groups of native workers" rather than on data for specific local markets, and therefore does not represent what actually happens in local labor markets with large number of immigrant workers.⁷

Illegal immigrants, of course, are not evenly spread over the United States, but are concentrated in the major urban areas also favored by black citizens and in industries and occupations where blacks have been overrepresented. Five of the top ten urban black population centers (i.e., Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York and Washington, D.C.) are also the

areas where most illegal immigrants have settled.⁸ Even several scholars who believe that immigrants don't displace a significant number of native workers on a nationwide scale agree that in areas heavily populated by immigrants, steep competition between similarly skilled immigrants and native workers can be significant.⁹

Philip Martin has convincingly demonstrated that illegal workers tend to dominate certain work forces because immigrants eventually gain control of mid-level supervisory positions and job recruitment (see Chapter 2). Martin's analysis of network recruitment may well be the best explanation for the demise of black occupational kinship networks in job sectors where blacks once functioned as the primary recruiters and supervisors. In addition, Robert Ainsworth, in his study published by the National Commission for Employment Policy also concluded that undocumented workers often cause job displacement through the use of occupational kinship networks.¹⁰

Richard Mines, who studied the effects of undocumented Mexican workers on labor markets in California between 1977 and 1985, has revealed how employment sectors, once filled by black workers, became dominated by immigrants receiving low wages. In the early 1980s, for example, employers in the high-rise office districts of Los Angeles began to use new contractors who had tapped into networks of recent immigrants to hire janitors. The rising proportion of immigrant janitors was accompanied by a substantial

decline in the number of native black janitors and hourly janitorial wages plummeted from an average of about \$13.00 an hour (including benefits) to just over the minimum wage. Mines also reported that employers replaced their veteran workers with recent immigrants in the frozen food industries in Watsonville, construction clean-up jobs in Orange County and janitorial work in San Jose.¹¹

The proliferation of job networks that are controlled by immigrants and in turn hire other immigrants has particularly harmed the employment prospects of blacks who look for jobs by using their friends and relatives. Almost one-fifth of unemployed blacks typically use fewer than two job-seeking methods; again, most often rely upon their friends and relatives.¹²

In addition, blacks have been increasingly shut out of jobs because of "linguistic" discrimination. In Florida for instance, many hotels and other service employers now hire only Spanish-speaking or bilingual workers. These employers often perceive a lack of "fit" between blacks and their Spanish-speaking employees and customers. A growing number of local school districts and public agencies in areas with heavy concentrations of immigrants are hiring fewer monolingual professionals. Many black professionals fluent only in English are now losing out to bilingual competitors.

Blacks might even agree that immigrants create some jobs. But too often the jobs created are not for domestic minorities, but for the next waves of immigrants recruited through ethnic networks, whether it be Miami's Cuban enclave, the garment industries of New York and New Jersey or the light industries of Los Angeles.

The controversy about the effects of immigrants and refugees on native black employment and earnings will persist until definitive data are available. But in the absence of such data, blacks and other vulnerable minorities deserve the benefit of the doubt: public policies should be shaped by values that promote economic equity for all citizens, including those Americans whose slave ancestors did not come to U.S. shores in search of freedom.

Attitudes About Immigration Reform and Control

Whatever the studies show, polls show blacks perceive serious job competition with Hispanic workers as a fact. The most representative poll of black and Hispanic attitudes about immigration prior to the act is the 1983 telephone poll of a nationally representative sample of 800 blacks and 800 Hispanics. The public opinion poll was conducted by V. Lance Tarrance and Associates and Peter D. Hart Research Associates. Almost 96 percent of the black and 59 percent of the Hispanic respondents were born in the United States, and 98 percent of these black and 76 percent of these Hispanic respondents were American citizens.

A comparison of the black and Hispanic responses

reveals considerable similarities and some differences. Hispanics were substantially more likely than blacks to regard immigration reform and control as a most important or very important national issue, to favor admitting more legal immigrants and to support milder laws for illegal aliens. They were, however, less likely to consider it a major problem when illegal immigrants harmed unemployed Americans or lowered American wages. Blacks and Hispanics were similar in the percentages supporting penalties against employers hiring illegal aliens. But the Hispanics were far more supportive of amnesty for undocumented workers. Both groups tended to favor amnesty for undocumented workers who had resided in the United States for at least five years. Hispanics were substantially more likely to support public school and bilingual education for illegal immigrants. Both groups tended to oppose welfare benefits, except Medicaid, for illegal immigrants. They also strongly agreed that ballots should be printed in both English and Spanish.

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Attitudes among the black respondents in the Tarrance-Hart poll did not differ substantially. Age and sex variations were slight. Compared to naturalized black citizens and non-citizens, native blacks were far more supportive of tougher restrictions against illegal and legal aliens and much more likely to believe that undocumented workers displaced American workers and depressed their wages and working conditions. Compared to those respondents who did not complete college, most college graduates favored tougher enforcement penalties to curb illegal immigration, but were somewhat less likely to support enforcement. The same pattern was true of respondents in upper white collar jobs as compared with all other respondents, and of those with household incomes of \$25,000 or more, as compared with lower-income respondents. In their support of free education, the black respondents did not differ significantly by income. Respondents whose incomes were under \$10,000 were substantially more likely to believe that illegal immigrants should be eligible for welfare benefits and Medicaid. Opposition to illegal aliens receiving welfare was positively correlated with income.

"Black resentment toward Cuban refugees in Miami ... after the Mariel Boatlift, may have helped precipitate the 1980 riots in that city."

The Tarrance-Hart findings for blacks generally

match the findings in other national and regional polls about immigration reform. For example, in a 1983 telephone survey of 1,031 English-speaking respondents in six urban counties of southern California by the Field Research Corporation, Thomas Muller and Thomas Espenshade reported that 91 percent of the black respondents believed that the problem of illegal immigrants in their area was very serious or somewhat serious. Most also believed that illegal immigrants displaced area residents (*especially blacks*), and depressed wages. Both the Field poll and a 1983 *Los Angeles Times* poll found that more than 80 percent of the blacks surveyed, a higher percentage than for whites, supported penalties against employers hiring undocumented workers.¹³ A 1986 poll by the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that 48 percent of its black respondents believed that undocumented workers take jobs from Californians.¹⁴ This percentage was only four percentage points higher than that reported in a 1986 *New York Times/CBS News Poll*.¹⁵ However, the results of these two polls and the Tarrance-Hart poll are not directly comparable, owing to their sampling and instrumental differences. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the proportion of blacks who believe that undocumented workers take jobs away from native workers has diminished over time. The results of these polls suggest that a strong plurality of blacks continue to believe that undocumented workers adversely affect many American workers.

A *Miami Herald* poll taken shortly after the 1980 Miami riots found that black attitudes towards specific immigrant groups tended to divide along ethnic lines. About 85 percent of the black respondents in Dade County (which included Miami) believed that the Cuban refugees had "hurt black changes," while only 47 percent believed that the Haitian presence was harmful.¹⁶ Black resentment towards Cuban refugees in Miami, whose numbers rapidly increased after the Mariel boatlift, may have helped to precipitate the 1980 riots in that city. Moreover, in other cities, some blacks aired their resentment towards Asian small shopowners in black neighborhoods or resisted Southeastern Asian settlement in some previously racially segregated black neighborhoods.

Some black resentment of immigrants and refugees has also surfaced in the media, and especially on talk and call-in shows about immigrants and refugees. But a primary cause of this resentment has been typically overlooked by the media and the non-black public. The stark differences in the American reception of Cuban and Haitian refugees were far too discriminatory for Congressman George W. Crockett, Jr. In his House speech, he spoke for millions of black Americans and other fair-minded Americans in protesting:

...[the] determined effort [of the INS and the Department of State] to exclude the first significant class of black refugees to come to our shores. The result has been racist in effect,

*regardless of intent... There has been much discussion that the [approximately 15,000] Haitian refugees are simply economic refugees and therefore not entitled to refuge in our country. This simplistic and distorted assertion emanates from a theoretical assumption that economics and politics are separable. This was not asserted nor could it be in the case of the Indochinese refugees.*¹⁷

Crockett believes strongly, as do most black Americans, that due process and equal protection under the law, as well as economic assistance, must also be accorded to non-white refugees. Black resentment against preferential treatment given to non-black refugees, such as most of the Cubans, can only be understood within this context.

In general, recent polls of black views on immigration, coupled with periodic reports in the media of certain black behavior towards immigrants and refugees, suggest strongly that most blacks favor immigration reform to halt illegal immigration and to reduce legal immigration. The view is based largely on their belief — rightly or wrongly — that many blacks have been and will continue to be harmed by the growing presence of immigrants, and because they tend to view native blacks and immigrants and refugees as prospective competitors who will increasingly gain an edge over them if history repeats itself.

Positions of Black Congressional Representatives

Until 1986 curbs on illegal immigration had virtually no support among blacks in Congress. In 1984 only one member of the Congressional Black Caucus, Harold Ford, voted for the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, despite the polls showing that a majority of American blacks supported employer sanctions.

"It is clear that black opposition to immigration reform ... was not due to any single set of causes."

Many observers were surprised when most black representatives failed to support fully the immigration bills of 1984 and 1986. Some of their surprise came from their assumption that the constituents of black representatives are black and that those representatives should vote the views of their constituents. But in fact only 60 percent of the blacks in the 99th Congress represented predominantly black districts; the majority of blacks in the United States do not reside in those districts. Another false assumption is that American blacks are politically monolithic and that they are the sole or primary constituents of black representatives in the Congress.

Some believe that the lack of support in 1984 and 1986 for immigration reform among black representatives was due to a presumed alliance with Hispanic congressmembers and with Hispanic political leaders in their districts. Five of the six black representatives with the largest proportion of Hispanics in their districts (over 20 percent) voted against the conference report of the 1986 bill. In contrast, four of the five representatives with the lowest percentages of Hispanics in their districts (1 percent or less) voted for the report, indicating that the presence or absence of Hispanic constituents was a factor in the representatives' voting patterns. But the rhetoric of the floor debate suggests a different story. Only one black representative referred explicitly or directly in the hearings or debates to the Hispanics' position as a reason for his opposition to the bill. Judging by the debate, the black congressmembers were more concerned with what they considered substantial flaws in the bill than they were with voting in tandem with some of their Hispanic colleagues.

Another factor in black opposition to the bill was the perception that the bill discriminated against Haitian refugees. The lack of provisions favorable to Haitian refugees in the 1982 version of the bill prompted the Congressional Black Caucus to form a Task Force on Haitian Refugees. H.R. 1510 provided for the legalization of all eligible Cuban and Haitian entrants in the United States, but Congressman George Crockett was still seriously concerned that the choice of a cut-off date of January 1980, instead of January 1982, was anti-Haitian, as most Haitians arrived after January 1980.¹⁸

In 1986 several Black Caucus members objected to the provisions for temporary agricultural workers and special agricultural workers. In a speech before the House, Representative George Crockett explained: "The paradox of using significant numbers of undocumented farmworkers during a time of intolerably high domestic unemployment in the agriculture industry only sustains the unjust system of low wages, substandard working conditions, and high profit margins that have produced such misery on our farms in the past."¹⁹ Congressmembers John Conyers, Jr., Ronald V. Dellums and Mickey Leland also opposed these provisions and what they saw as a lack of enforceable sanctions in the bills.

Most of the black representatives favored generous amnesty and believed that it was the most important part of the bill. Although he was also troubled by the probability that legalization would harm American workers, Congressman Major R. Owens supported amnesty (but not blanket amnesty), even though he believed that it was not favored by his constituents.²⁰

A majority of the black representatives supported amendments to the 1986 bill that would hold employers responsible for verifying applicant eligibility (73.7 percent), delete criminal penalties against employers who knowingly and willfully continued to violate the

law by hiring undocumented workers (55.6 percent), require the INS to obtain search warrants for open farmlands (82.4 percent) and permit illegal aliens to live in public housing (88.2 percent). They unequivocally voted to: prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of alienage, with enforcement by a Special Counsel in the Department of Justice; and to delete EVD for undocumented Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. Many of the amendments favored by most black representatives, however, were deleted from the final version of the bill.²¹

It is clear that black opposition to immigration reform in 1984 and, partially, in 1986 was not due to any single set of causes. Some were concerned that the flawed legislation would neither end the use of easily exploited foreign agricultural workers nor secure the border and be fair and just for many illegal aliens. The reasons for the shift from almost blanket opposition in 1984 to a slim majority favoring the bill in 1986 varies among individual representatives, but includes such factors as constituent pressure to support legalization and pressure from non-black congressional colleagues to favor a much-needed bill. Most likely too, there was underlying concern about job displacement and depressed wages and working conditions of American workers who were forced to compete with foreign workers.

Likely Impacts of the Act on Blacks

It is too early to determine precisely what effects the act will have on blacks, particularly those in metropolitan areas with large concentrations of lower-class blacks and recent immigrants, refugees and illegal aliens. The greatest impact is likely in the areas of employment, education and public welfare services. Unless the INS rigorously enforces the provisions for employer sanctions, including the rules to combat casual hiring and loopholes for general contractors, few blacks will gain the jobs left by undocumented workers. Even if sanctions do prevent employers from hiring undocumented aliens, they may, for a time, opt to employ refugees and recent immigrants to the extent possible instead of native blacks. The possible relocation of more low-wage American businesses abroad may also harm the employment prospects of some blacks. But if wages and working conditions improve nationwide in the secondary labor market, blacks should come out ahead overall.

Public schools are sites of increasing tension and conflict among poor minorities and whites. Among the major challenges are achieving the proper racial and ethnic composition of administrators and faculty and distributing resources between bilingual and remedial programs. The increasingly frequent hiring of bilingual staff tends to decrease the number of black teachers and to deplete the resources available for remedial courses. An increase in the number of persons eligible for public welfare services, such as health care and public housing, will undoubtedly burden certain local and state governments, leading to increased taxes, reduced services, or both.

While Congress in the act mandated a triennial comprehensive immigration impact report, it unfortunately did not provide for specific reports on the effect of the act on native blacks and other groups who most often compete with recent immigrants, refugees and illegal aliens. While blacks share a responsibility for monitoring the impacts and lobbying for public policies to reduce them, the major responsibility for effective leadership in assimilating these newcomers lies with the federal government.

Given the racial and ethnic polarization which could increase as a consequence of legalization, black and other American citizens must work harder to improve intergroup relations. Concerned citizens should urge Congress to support better border control, a higher minimum wage and adequate federal funding to ease the burden to state and local governments charged with delivering health, educational and human welfare services to the newcomers. In addition, citizens should urge their representatives to make sure our immigration laws are enforced in a non-discriminatory way and perhaps reconsider EVD status for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. Furthermore, blacks and Hispanics should heed Congressman Crockett's warnings against an agribusiness policy which would use hiring methods that foster job displacement and wage depression for many U.S. workers. They should urge American employers to first "cast down their buckets" for willing native workers.

NOTES

¹ W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro, A Social Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1899), p. 33.

² See, e.g., Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro*, Sterling D. Spero and Abram L. Harris, *The Black Worker* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), and William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race, Blacks and Changing American Institutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).

³ Quoted in Francis L. Broderick and August Meier, eds., *Negro Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century* (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 5-6.

⁴ John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New York: Atheneum, 1978), p. 114.

⁵ See, e.g., L.F. Chapman Jr., *Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* (GPO,

1974), pp. iii-iv, Kingsley Davis, "The Migrations of Human Populations," *Scientific American*, Vol. 231, 1974, pp. 93-105, David North and Marion Houston, *The Characteristics and Roles of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study* (WDC: New Transcentury, 1976), Jacquelyne J. Jackson, "Illegal Aliens: Big Threat to Black Workers," *Ebony*, Vol. 34 (1979); pp. 33-36, 38 and 40, John Reid, *Black America in the 1980s* (WDC: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., December 1982), Briggs, Immigration Policy, John K. Hill, "The Economic Impact of Tighter U.S. Border Security," *Economic Review* (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 1985), pp. 12-20, James E. Pearce and Jeffery W. Gunther, "Illegal Immigration from Mexico: Effects on the Texas Economy," *Economic Review* (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, September 21985), pp. 1-11, and Philip Martin, *Illegal Immigration and the Colonization of the American Labor Market* (WDC: Center for Immigration Studies, 1986).

⁶ Kevin F. McCarthy and R. Burciago Valdez, *Current and Future Effects of Mexican Immigration in California: Executive Summary* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1985) and Thomas Muller and Thomas J. Espenshade, *The Fourth Wave, California's Newest Immigrants* (WDC: The Urban Institute Press, 1985).

⁷ George Borjas and Marta Tienda, "The Economic Consequences of Immigration," *Science*, February 6, 1987, p. 647.

⁸ This estimation is based on a variety of reports about the geographical distribution of undocumented aliens. Approximately 2.1 million undocumented aliens were counted in the 1980 census and the annual net increase since then has

Table 2. Voting patterns of black representatives on the 1984 and 1986 immigration reform legislation

Representative	State	(1984)	(1986)
		H.R. 1510	H.R. 3810
William L. Clay	Mo.	Nay	Yea
Cardiss Collins	Ill.	Nay	Yea
John Conyers, Jr.	Mich.	Nay	Not Voting*
George W. Crockett, Jr.	Mich.	Nay	Not Voting
Ronald V. Dellums	Cal.	Nay	Nay
Julian C. Dixon	Cal.	Nay	Yea
Mervyn M. Dymally	Cal.	Nay	Nay
Harold E. Ford	Tenn.	Yea	Yea
William H. Gray III	Pa.	Nay	Yea
Katie Hall	Ind.	Nay	—
Augustus F. Hawkins	Cal.	Nay	Nay
Charles A. Hayes	Ill.	Nay	Nay
Mickey Leland	Texas	Not Voting	Nay
Parren J. Mitchell	Md.	Nay	Not Voting*
Major R. Owens	N.Y.	Nay	Yea
Charles B. Rangel	N.Y.	Nay	Yea
Gus Savage	Ill.	Nay	Nay
Louis Stokes	Ohio	Nay	Yea
Edolphus Towns	N.Y.	Nay	Nay
Alton R. Waldon, Jr.	N.Y.	—	Yea
Alan Wheat	Mo.	Nay	Yea

Sources: *Congressional Record*, June 20, 1984; *Congressional Record*, October 9, 1986
*Not Voting, but paired against passage of bill.

been estimated at about 200,000 annually (U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 1000, *Estimates of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex and Race: 1980 to 1986* (GPO, 1987). Also see Jeffrey S. Passel and Karen A. Woodrow, "Geographic Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census by State," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 18 (1984), pp. 642-671.

⁹ Vernon M. Briggs, *Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1984) and Borjas and Tienda, "The Economic Consequences of Immigration."

¹⁰ Robert G. Ainsworth, *Illegal Immigrants and Refugees—Their Economic Adaptation and Impact on Local U.S. Labor Markets: A Review of the Literature* (WDC: National Commission for Employment Policy, Research Report Series, RR-86-22, October 1986), pp. vii-viii.

¹¹ Richard Mines, "Undocumented Immigrants and California Industries: Reflections on Research," for Hearings of the Intergovernmental Relations Committee, November 15, 1985.

¹² See, e.g. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, Bulletin 2217 (GPO, June 1985), pp. 85 and 88.

¹³ *Los Angeles Times* July 25, 1983.

¹⁴ *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 2, 1986.

¹⁵ *New York Times/CBS News Poll*, 1986.

¹⁶ *The Miami Herald* poll of May 11, 1980, as cited in John F. Stack Jr., ed., *The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 10.

¹⁷ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 130, No. 185, June 20, 1984, p. H 6126.

¹⁸ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 130, No. 85, pp. H 6126 and H 6127.

¹⁹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 132, No. 139, October 9, 1986, p. H 9733.

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 130, No. 84, June 19, 1984, p. H 6054.

²¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 132, No. 139, October 9, 1986.